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A peculiar jubilee will be celebrated in December 
2006 – ten years since instantiating construction of the 
Chinese-Kyrgyz-Uzbek trunk-railway. During this period 
the three states undertook vigorous eff orts to come to 
an agreement with each other about various aspects of 
designing and constructing the transportation corridor 
which would have connected China along a new route 
with Europe and Middle East through Central Asia. 
There was a particular urgency about the issue for 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and China in the latter half of 
1990s. It was on the agenda for negotiations at vari-
ous levels between the three states including the top 
leadership. At the same time, the parties have made 
numerous declarations highlighting the launch of the 
“project of the century”. Though they never started 
or even approached constructing the main railway. 
This lack of progress piques a natural interest both 
in the states involved in the project, the neighbor-
ing states and those states with political, economic 
and other interests in Central Asia. What is the rea-
son behind this protracted process? Is there the pos-
sibility of eventually turning the idea into reality?
Briefl y on background of the issue. The most active 
phase of work on the project was in the late 1990s. The 
fi rst meeting of representatives from transportation 
agencies for the three countries to discuss the issue of 
conducting research and pre-design work on construc-
tion of a new Kashgar-Osh-Andijan trunk-railway took 
place in Tashkent in December 1996. As a result of the 
initial meeting, the parties agreed on the following: 
“Taking into account the decision made by the People’s 
Republic of China on construction of a new Korla-Kash-
gar trunk-railway with the total mileage of 970 kilome-
ters, which anticipates completion of all work by 2000 
(this section was successfully completed by the target 
date), and commencement of service along the newly 
constructed Tedjen-Serahs-Mashhаd Railroad, creates 
the basis for construction of a southern spur line of 
intercontinental trunk-railway, which connects in the 
shortest route ports on the east of PRC with the states 
of the Middle East and Southern Europe through the 
states of Central Asia… The parties, considering the 
importance of the issue, expansion and strengthening 
of good-neighborly relations and economic ties be-
tween PRC, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, consider it ex-
pedient to undertake all required research and pre-de-
sign work along all possible directions of the route….” 
China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed a pro-
tocol on institutionalizing the work on the project in 
a trilateral format. Through creation of a joint work-
ing commission in April 1997, this protocol was 
created during a symposium called “New Transeu-
roasiatic Bridge” devoted to the construction of the 
China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railroad in Tashkent. 
Representatives of about twenty countries, interna-
tional and regional fi nancial organizations have also 
participated in this symposium; the commission was 
headed by Vice-Prime Ministers of Kyrgyzstan and Uz-
bekistan, and Deputy Minister for Railroads of China. 
The fi rst meeting of the joint working commis-
sion was held in Bishkek in November 1997. During 
the commission’s early work, the parties were able to 
come to a common understanding about a number 
of issues. Although the main issue – the option for 
the passage of the future route remained unresolved. 
As a result, the parties decided to set up a trilateral 
joint expert working group. The task of the working 
group was to draft a preliminary technical and eco-
nomic assessment along two directions – southern and 
northern options for the passage of the trunk-railway. 
During the 1998-2000 timeframe, specialists from 
the three states actively studied northern and south-
ern options by visiting the sites. Chinese and Uzbek 
sides suggested adopting the southern option through 
Irkeshtam check-point, while the Kyrgyz side favored 
the northern option through Torugart check-point. 
The second meeting of the commission was held in 
2001 in Beijing. At that time, the Chinese and Kyrgyz 
sides basically agreed on the northern optimized option 
through Torugart as the basis for construction. The Uz-
bek side, after failing to secure a favorable southern op-
tion, offi  cially decided that it would take a neutral stand.
After the second meeting of the commission when 
fundamental diff erences among the parties on the itin-
erary for the passage of the route emerged again, the 
interest in the project on the part of Uzbekistan and lat-
er China gradually started fading away. Notwithstand-
THE «JUBILEE» OF THE CHINESE-KYRGYZ-UZBEK RAILROAD
Analysts from a number of states have expressed various opinions and operating assumptions regarding the exist-
ing obstacles and the prospects of the railroad coming to fruition. It could be seen in the positive interests of Beijing to 
strengthen and consolidate its position in Central Asia as well as bind itself to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan through trunk-
railroad construction. Though the Chinese leadership has a number of outstanding concerns. The decisive concern for 
Beijing is, probably, the instability of the political situation in these two Central Asian states.
Erlan Abdyldaev, Expert of the Institute for Public Policy, former Ambassador of the
Kyrgyz Republic to People’s Republic of China
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ing numerous and desperate eff orts of Bishkek to con-
tinue the project and make an attempt to bring togeth-
er the two other sides, it did not work out. Experts from 
Uzbekistan stopped participating in working meet-
ings and the work of the joint commission was forced 
into a bilateral format between Kyrgyzstan and China. 
Chinese and Kyrgyz sides declared the completion of 
the work on the comprehensive study of the construc-
tion of the Chinese-Kyrgyz-Uzbek Railroad with the 
northern optimized option in December 2003 in Beijing. 
No signifi cant breakthroughs in advancement on 
this project have taken place since December 2003. 
As the new President Bakiev came to power, at-
tempts were made to reanimate the project. During 
his offi  cial visits to PRC and Uzbekistan in June and 
October 2006, Bakiev strove to enlist the support of 
the top Chinese and Uzbek leadership. However both 
Beijing and Tashkent did not speak unambiguously on 
this issue. In their joint statement as a result of Presi-
dent Bakiev’s visit to China, the sides declared that they 
would continue the project. As a result of Bakiev’s visit 
to Uzbekistan, the issue of the trilateral railroad part-
nership did not even make it to the fi nal statement. 
The main conclusion drawn by Chinese and Kyrgyz 
experts in the Comprehensive Report is that from a 
technical point of view construction of the Chinese-
Kyrgyz-Uzbek Railroad along the northern optimized 
option is quite feasible. Notwithstanding a relief diffi  -
cult to access, there are no insurmountable obstacles. 
The experts’ conclusion was also based on the expe-
rience of Chinese railroad constructors, who, at that 
time, were speeding up construction of the Qinghai-
Tibet Railroad (QTR), the highest-altitude and longest 
railroad in the world with a total mileage of 1,956 ki-
lometers at a height of over 4,000 meters. Construc-
tion of QTR was successfully completed and the fi rst 
train was launched on July 1, 2006. Mr. Sun Yunfu, 
the Deputy Minister for Railroads of China, who ini-
tially was the Co-Chairman of the joint commission 
on construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbeki-
stan Railroad, headed the QTR construction project. 
Chinese and Kyrgyz experts identifi ed the issue 
of funding as the main problem hindering forward 
movement in the Comprehensive Report. According 
to preliminary estimates the Kyrgyz section alone, 
with total mileage of approximately 250 kilometers, 
requires over one million U.S. dollars. Economic effi  -
ciency of the railroad was identifi ed by the experts as 
the second problem. By the specialists’ calculations, 
in order to both repay the investment in 10-15 years 
and operate the railroad at a profi t, it is necessary to 
allow no less than fi ve million tons of freight per year. 
(By comparison, after more than 15 years of work, the 
volume of freightage through Druzhba-Alashankou, 
at the Kyrgyz-Chinese border, is barely approaching 
10 million tons. Energy resources and ores of non-fer-
rous and ferrous metal make up the bulk of the freight).
Having completed the work on the Comprehen-
sive Report and expressed the arguments in sup-
port of and against the project, the experts handed 
over the fi nal decision to the political leadership 
of their states. However, a fi nal coordinated deci-
sion on this project by the political leadership of 
the three states has not been made. China has the 
decisive vote in moving to implement the project. 
Analysts from a number of states have expressed vari-
ous opinions and operating assumptions regarding the 
existing obstacles and the prospects of the railroad com-
ing to fruition. It could be seen in the positive interests 
of Beijing to strengthen and consolidate its position in 
Central Asia as well as bind itself to Uzbekistan and Kyr-
gyzstan through trunk-railroad construction. Though 
the Chinese leadership has a number of outstanding 
concerns. The decisive concern for Beijing is, probably, 
the instability of the political situation in these two Cen-
tral Asian states. The Ferghana Valley hosts a number of 
unresolved, volatile problems in both domestic politics 
in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. With intergovernmen-
tal and regional signifi cance, radical Islamists could 
gain momentum and unite with Xingjian separatists. 
These trends do not give Beijing an impetus to speed 
up this project without resolving these issues fi rst.
In the context of making decisions on implement-
ing such large projects, China proceeds from the stand-
point of friendly relations with the political leadership 
in both  Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. However there 
are issues in this regard as well – periodically emerg-
ing disputes regarding the Kyrgyz-Chinese border in 
Kyrgyzstan and the mercurial quality of Uzbekistan’s 
foreign policy. The Chinese leadership is not confi -
dent about the stability of the political situations in 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It is not interested in ty-
ing its explosive Xingjian to the unstable situation 
in the Central Asian states and risking changes in 
the foreign policy passions of local political elites. 
According to a number of experts, the global war 
on terrorism waged by the U.S. beginning in 2001 
also had a negative eff ect on the prospects of imple-
menting this project. By the U.S. including Iran on 
the list of states that support terrorism and the re-
cent emergence of the Iranian nuclear problem have 
made the transit of freight through Iran problematic. 
This backdrop makes the idea of the Chinese-Kyr-
gyz-Uzbek Railroad route for shorter access from 
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China to Europe and the Middle East questionable. 
There are also quite well-founded doubts in the 
future competitiveness of the new railroad transport 
passage compared to the existing routes through Rus-
sia and Kazakhstan and to sea shipping as was noted 
above from the point of security, stability and reli-
ability. Russia and Kazakhstan, as well as other states, 
which presently control these transport fl ows are not 
interested in implementation of this project. In fact, 
they will likely take various steps in order to hinder 
it or at a minimum, further decrease its investment 
attractiveness. Today, Russia is investing its own sig-
nifi cant funds into improving the infrastructure of the 
Trans-Siberian Railroad by reducing freight rates and 
transit time through their territories as well as guaran-
teeing safety and the preservation of freight. In 2003 
Kazakhstan announced a vast construction scheme for 
a Trans-Kazakh narrow-gauge line with the total mile-
age of several thousand kilometers which they were 
undertaking with signifi cant capital expenditures.
Over ten states along the route from China to Eu-
rope and through the Middle East could become an-
other important problem, creating insurmountable ob-
stacles in the implementation of the project. It is neces-
sary to coordinate a number of elements related to vi-
sas, systems of various permits, tariff s, and other issues 
connected with the transit of passengers and freight. 
Given the multi-directional domestic and foreign 
policy courses of the states involved, which are often 
contradictory and the presence of a signifi cant number 
of intergovernmental problems at various levels, the 
coordination process could take decades. The recent 
delay with implementation of the Transport Corridor 
Europe-Caucasus-Asia project, a quadruple agreement 
between Pakistan, PRC, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
(1996) on traffi  c highway service and a number of other 
regional transport projects with more than two states 
as parties, is illustrative of the potential for problems. 
All of the abovementioned problematic aspects of 
constructing a new Transeuroasiatic transport cor-
ridor appear to be outside the borders of Kyrgyzstan. 
Meanwhile, even in a hypothetical situation whereby 
all of the issues could be resolved in a timely man-
ner, which is unlikely according to experts, the most 
complicated problem is the internal situation. Do-
mestic political instability and the uncertainty in the 
country, a generally weak economy and slow rates of 
socio-economic development plague the country. As 
a result, the investment appeal of this project is prob-
lematic for foreign investors. Obviously, it would have 
a signifi cant domestic, socio-economic and interna-
tional importance to Kyrgyzstan. However, the country 
lacks the internal fi nancial reserves and independent 
sources for railroad construction. This predicament im-
plies only one option – foreign borrowing from those 
states and institutions which have purely political or 
strategic interests in this project other than economic. 
At the present time, there is only one state which 
has openly stated that under certain terms it is ready 
to provide Kyrgyzstan with funds on a bilateral basis for 
the construction of the Kyrgyz section of the railroad: 
China. Beijing has not elaborated on the terms under 
which it is ready to provide funding. Bearing in mind 
China’s interests and experience in Central Asia, it is 
likely that the terms will not be simple for Kyrgyzstan. 
At a minimum, they will demand from the Kyrgyz lead-
ership a thorough and weighted study of all project 
scenarios and the political will in making the fi nal deci-
sion. The hopes of the Kyrgyz leadership to implement 
this project within the stated regional economic coop-
eration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will 
unlikely materialize due to a mismatch in the economic 
approaches of the Russian Federation and PRC within 
the framework of the Organization. Plus as mentioned 
above, due to the competition of this trunk-railway with 
the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese-Kazakh railroads. 
Taking into consideration the aforementioned slew 
of issues, the prospects of the Chinese-Kyrgyz-Uzbek 
trunk-railway are indefi nite and bleak as it was origi-
nally envisioned at the beginning – constructing a new 
Transeuroasiatic railroad from Shanghai to Paris. With 
this projection, it sounds like utopia rather than real-
ity. According to a number of experts, with the goal of 
minimizing the infl uence of externally unfavorable 
factors, it would be more feasible to view this project 
as regional, initially connecting PRC with Central Asia 
along the new northern route. However, even with this 
projection, implementation of the project will likely 
be possible only under complete political stability and 
security in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and after estab-
lishing sustainable and mutually benefi cial political and 
economic relations between PRC, Kyrgyzstan and Uz-
bekistan. Additionally, to entice China further, it would 
take the emergence of lucrative economic projects in 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan primarily in the mineral in-
dustry. Without resolving these lingering problems it 
is likely that we may celebrate many more “jubilees” of 
studies and discussions, not the real implementation of 
the construction of the Chinese-Kyrgyz-Uzbek Railroad. 
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Unemployment of Youth in Kyrgyzstan: Particularities of the Problem and 
Possible Solutions
Labor represents a significant factor of production, 
and efficient usage of the work force is an integral fac-
tor in sustainable long-term economic growth and 
alleviation of poverty. Fifteen years since the unprec-
edented regime transformation, Kyrgyzstan continues 
to face a crisis in the sphere of employment, involv-
ing an extremely high level of unemployment and the 
inhibited development of a fully-operational labor 
market. These conditions form additional barriers for 
youth on the job market. 
The current high level of unemployment contrib-
utes to the massive level of labor migration. Based 
on the existing data, approximately 30% of the eco-
nomically-active population is working outside of the 
country, with young citizens constituting the major-
ity of this percentage. Considering the demographic 
specificities of the country, with expected growth in 
the next decade of the proportion of the workforce 
made by up by young people, it is obvious that se-
rious attention should be paid to the issue of youth 
employment.
To be effective, the state’s youth employment pol-
icy should be differentiated and targeted on specific 
groups of the young population. It should combine 
proactive policy in the employment area with preven-
tive measures that would improve employment op-
portunities for youth in the long-term. 
Kyrgyzstan’s labor market in the transitional pe-
riod 
In the 1990s, serious political and economic chang-
es dramatically influenced job markets in the former 
socialistic countries. During the transition period, 
both the supply of and the demand for labor changed. 
In Kyrgyzstan, official data shows that the able-bodied 
population increased by 12% (from 2613.7 thousand 
to 2922.7 thousand) from 1999 to 2004 . The full em-
ployment that was typical of socialist times became 
history. For the last six years, supply on the job market 
has been advancing beyond demand by an average of 
32% (National Employment Program until 2010). The 
economics of the country have undergone significant 
sectoral changes: industry has decreased, and new 
sectors have appeared, mainly in the service sector. 
Large numbers of people ended up not having jobs, 
which severely influenced the level of economic ac-
tivity.
In Kyrgyzstan, many people who lost their jobs 
switched to the shadow and natural economies. Un-
employment also led to intensive migration, both 
within the country (from the regions and villages to 
the capital) and emigration. The exact level of unem-
ployment is unknown, but the scope and lingering na-
ture of it are obvious without official figures.  
It is worth stating that official employment figures 
do not reflect the real situation due to deficiencies in 
statistical methods, as well as some objective factors, 
including a large share of latent market activity and 
informal employment.
Registered unemployment stands at the level of 
3.0-3.3 percent, although the general level of unem-
ployment according to the National Employment Pro-
gram makes up 9%. Meager allowances, from 250 to 
700 soms per month, which only 15% of registered 
unemployed receive, do not serve as an incentive for 
all unemployed to register with employment services. 
In addition, the actual opportunities to find a job pro-
vided for citizens by employment services are highly 
limited, and do not instill much hope in job-hunters. 
The rate of youth unemployment based on official 
data stands at 10%. This number is widely recognized 
to be only the tip of the iceberg.  
One peculiar feature of the current job market is 
the significant proportion of the population that is 
economically inactive (24%), the major part of which 
consists of people who have lost any hope to find a 
job as a result of long-term unemployment. The ma-
jority of registered unemployed have not worked for 
more than a year, i.e. they can be classified as long-
term unemployed. Almost 60% of registered unem-
ployed youth is made up of long-term unemployed, 
with a considerable number consisting of university 
graduates (14%). Overall, the job market is dominated 
by such movements as “employment-employment” or 
“unemployment-inactivity” rather than “unemploy-
ment-employment.”
Particularities of youth segment of the job market 
in Kyrgyzstan
Up until now, attention has mainly been paid to the 
phenomenon of unemployment in general. Although, 
youth unemployment doubtlessly reflects the general 
level of unemployment in the country and the state 
of the economy to a large extent, the specifics of the 
The youth employment policy must be matched with the strategy of youth development and target programs, and 
also must be coordinated by fi nancial, credit, and investment policies of state, as well as by sector-specifi c policies 
(agriculture, education, industry, and others). The starting point must be strategies for economic and social development.
Anar Musabaeva, Expert of the Institute for Public Policy
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Unemployment of Youth in Kyrgyzstan: Particularities of the Problem and 
Possible Solutions
youth job market, characterized by additional barriers 
for young, able-bodied citizens, predetermine the ne-
cessity of paying special attention to youth employ-
ment. Changes in the cumulative demand for labor 
and any macroeconomic changes particularly affect 
young people, especially those who are novices in the 
job market.  
The problematic entry of 
youth into the job market 
advances poverty among 
this group, forces youth 
to switch to the informal 
sector, famous for its bad 
working conditions, health 
risks, and absence of so-
cial protection, as well as 
increases the chances of youth engaging in various 
antisocial activities.
The issue of youth employment is important be-
cause youth makes up a large segment of the job 
market structure, which currently entails a tendency 
towards growth of the labor supply. Persons younger 
than thirty-four years old make up 59.4% of the total 
labor force (2922.7 thousand people). The level of eco-
nomic activity, especially in the 25-29 and 30-34 years 
age groups, is fairly high (90%), but level of employ-
ment in the country is generally lower, 64.3% in 2004. 
Based on the existing evidence the ratio of youth 
among total unemployed makes up more than half, 
about 53% (National statistics committee. Gender Re-
lationship in the Kyrgyz Republic. 2005, pages 68-71.) 
The youth job market is characterized by peculiarly 
high instability and a misbalance between demand 
and supply due to changes in the career goals of 
youth and a high level of diversity. Hence, about fifty 
thousands university graduates with various degrees 
enter the job market annually. Since the market is lim-
ited, the majority of graduates fail to find a job corre-
sponding to their degree. Those who manage to find 
a job often work in an area different from their pro-
fessional sphere. Hence retraining becomes the only 
chance for getting a job for a majority of graduates. 
This fact explains a large number of youth pursuing 
second degree. 
It is worth noting that youth especially novice to 
the job market is not competitive since majority of 
employers prefer hiring staff with professional skills 
and relevant job experience. Unlike adults, youth has 
fewer opportunities for self-employment and opening 
a business due to insufficient skills, financial resources 
and absence of mortgage for receiving a loan. 
The growing number of young university gradu-
ates who end up among the ranks of the unemployed 
signifies a loss of investment and a waste of human 
resources for the state and society.
The decline of economic 
activity among the youth is 
justified to a certain extent 
by the fact that a portion 
moves to the black labor 
market. Another small part 
of the youth commits to 
the natural economy. The 
percent of unemployed 
youth in rural areas is very 
high, since all opportunities are limited there except 
agriculture. There are no exact figures on unemploy-
ment rates among disabled youth, but it is easy to 
guess that this vulnerable subgroup falls under the 
long-term unemployed category. 
Unemployment and low-paid jobs contribute to 
the fact that youth become victims of human traffick-
ing more often than other population segments. In 
their attempts to work abroad, part of the youth uses 
the services of organized crime, dealing with human 
trafficking and jeopardizing their health and personal 
safety. Cases of enslavement are not rare.
The issue of youth unemployment is also fraught 
with increasing social problems such as violence, sui-
cide, and drug abuse. 
Among the positive changes of youth employment, 
one can list the emergence of young businessmen, 
bankers, and managers in the private and non-com-
mercial sector. Young people are becoming increas-
ingly involved in areas of new economic develop-
ment– trade, communications, and the service sector. 
Unfortunately, the percentage of youth employed in 
the civil servant sphere is insignificant.
The National Employment Program until 2010
The recently-adopted program “National Employ-
ment Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic until 2010” calls for 
a proactive approach to issues of regulating the job 
market. It outlines a fairly conventional set of objec-
tives in the area of employment. In particular, it sets 
objectives for increasing the flexibility of the market 
and the mobility of the work force, for creating con-
Based on the data of a national survey conducted in Kyrgyzstan from March to April 2005, the highest priority 
issues in the country are those of unemployment and economic development. Correspondingly, the main problems 
that families are facing include fi nding a job and improving their fi nancial well-being. (IRI, Baltic Surveys, The Gallup 
organization)
IRI, Baltic Surveys, The Gallup organization
Currently one of the greatest challenges 
for the country is the integration of youth 
into the labor market. This category of 
the population should receive priority in 
the course of Program implementation. 
(From the Program “National Employment 
Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic until 2010.”)
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ditions for the development of entrepreneurship, and 
for improving the investment climate. Also addressed 
is the creation of adequate policy in the areas of pro-
fessional training, development of the regions, and 
improvement of the quality of job placement services 
and the job market infrastructure. 
Other changes foreseen include the implementa-
tion of paid community work, improvement of consul-
tative and information services on the job market, and 
introduction of innovations to Labor Law aimed at in-
creasing the flexibility of the job market and liberal-
izing temporary employment (short term contracts) 
from excessive regulation. The program also sets as 
a goal the building up of employment capacity in a 
range of economics sectors, including agriculture, oil 
and other energy resources, mountain and mining in-
dustries, and services such as construction, transpor-
tation, and tourism.
Youth is not mentioned frequently in the program, 
although youth employment is named as a priority is-
sue. Foremost attention is directed toward the youth 
that are new to the job market and toward the most 
vulnerable groups of youth (orphans, disabled, refu-
gees, etc.). The program envisages the opening of a 
youth labor registry office and an increase in the role 
of basic professional education.  
The national employment program emphasizes 
the importance of organizing paid community work. 
This type of program is applied in different forms in 
many countries. It is probably worth considering to 
what extent the programs are efficient in terms of 
expenses and expected results. The practice in many 
countries of organizing public works has proved to be 
an expensive program that does not lead to a dras-
tic reduction in unemployment. Nevertheless, such a 
program might serve as a short term tool for provid-
ing minimum income opportunities to the poorest 
groups. The particularities of community works pro-
grams must be contemplated prior to their prioritiza-
tion as employment programs.
Lessons to be learned
In order to increase the effectiveness of employ-
ment policy, it is necessary to learn lessons from situa-
tions past and present. Up until today, issues of youth 
employment have remained insufficiently integrated 
into general employment policy. In its turn, the na-
tional employment policy is still not clearly outlined 
in the strategic economic and social development of 
the country for the near future. Without it, it is difficult 
to forecast further economic development, and hence 
difficulty to forecast the dynamics of labor market de-
velopment. In my opinion, it is important to pay at-
tention to several factors and draw lessons from the 
current situation.  
Study instead of labor 
In the past, the previous regime gave the “green 
light” to the establishment of numerous educational 
institutions in the country for several reasons. The 
principle was that higher education would give youth 
more chances for employment, that the quality of ed-
ucation would be regulated by the market, and that 
gradually weak and useless educational institutions 
would naturally disappear as a result of competition. 
Under conditions of massive unemployment, this un-
dertaking also was meant to keep youth from “loafi ng 
in the streets” and to “keep them busy with studies.”
Thus, in terms of infl uencing the employment situ-
ation, education was a tool for prolonging the period 
before youth entered the job market. Certainly, the 
boom in higher education lowered tension in the la-
bor market for some time. However, the results appear 
to be diff erent from the ones intended. In the end, the 
massive graduation of specialists beyond the demand-
ed of the labor market has worsened the employment 
situation, since an integrated approach to employ-
ment policy, which should have been primarily based 
on the strategic economic development of the state, 
was not undertaken, analysis and forecasting of the 
situation on the labor market was not conducted, and 
appropriate actions were not taken. 
Labor migration
Another lesson for Kyrgyzstan must be taken from 
the massive emigration of the work force. The export 
of labor surplus is one method to solve unemploy-
ment, but at the expense of reducing the domestic 
supply of labor. Our country is not unique in this re-
spect, since many countries have pragmatic approach 
towards the emigration of labor resources. Emigration 
eases social tension and provides apparent economic 
benefi ts in the form of money transfers. Several local 
analysts view this phenomenon as almost the only de-
velopment strategy for Kyrgyzstan at the moment, be-
cause other sectors of economy are uncompetitive (E. 
Djamanbaev in talk show “Zloe Pero”, October 5, 2006). 
There is an opinion that migration benefi ts youth 
through providing work experience and skills, and thus 
they come back enriched. Such statement is probably 
only partially true about the youth of Kyrgyzstan: It is 
no secret that specialists with a university degree and 
technical education often leave the country, but there 
is a tendency for such high-skilled workers to emigrate 
for long periods of time, or forever. Additionally, the 
type of jobs in which our co-nationals work prevent us 
from making statements as to the gradual build up of 
the capacity of human resources.  
Despite recognition of certain advantages of migra-
tion, it is pitiful that Kyrgyzstan has turned this tool 
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Unemployment of Youth in Kyrgyzstan: Particularities of the Problem and 
Possible Solutions
into some sort of panacea for the domestic labor mar-
ket. Many analysts have turned their attention to the 
negative consequences of massive labor migration, 
especially regarding long-term prospects (E. Omarov. 
How to stop feeling of kyrgyzstani from Kyrgyzstan? 
Source: http://www.tazar.kg/news.php?i=1584). Shar-
ing the opinion of these latter analysts, I would like 
to highlight the ways in which the stimulation of emi-
gration without parallel state actions directed toward 
the resolution of domestic employment problems and 
overall development of the country produces serious 
negative consequences. 
This issue concerns the labor market, development 
of the country, and national security. It seems not quite 
appropriate to justify the massive migration of able-
bodied youth from Kyrgyzstan to the eff ect of export-
ing labor resources to other countries. One should not 
forget that Kyrgyzstan is not Turkey or Mexico, which 
can boast multimillion populations. It is important to 
have measures on protecting the rights of our citizens 
working in other countries and on creating a legisla-
tive framework for legal labor migration. The State Mi-
gration Committee and several public organizations 
are currently working on such measures. However, 
if no other counter actions are taken to improve the 
economic situation in the country, such a strategy will 
not help to overcome the crisis in the sphere employ-
ment, and could bring fairly negative consequences. It 
is extremely important to identify actions which would 
allow us, on the one hand, to make the most positive 
short-term outcome of labor migration, and, on the 
other hand, to create sustainable tendencies for de-
creasing emigration and creating more favorable con-
ditions in the sphere of domestic employment in the 
long term. For instance, serious consideration should 
be given to strategies which would attract our co-na-
tionals back home by providing chances to develop 
their own businesses, establishing tax privileges, pro-
viding access to loans, etc.  
How to stop the “brain drain” represents another 
question. Since independence, Kyrgyzstan has already 
irrevocably lost thousands of qualifi ed staff . It is even 
more disappointing that the urge for emigration is 
still strong among the most educated youth, includ-
ing those who have earned degrees from American, 
European and other universities abroad. Opportuni-
ties for self-actualization are quite limited for them in 
the country. The irrational policy on human resources, 
market defi ciencies, and a high level of corruption in 
society all serve to limit the opportunities for educat-
ed and talented youth. The majority of them work in 
a specifi c labor market, mainly in international orga-
nizations or local NGOs, funded by international do-
nors. This labor market is very narrow (limited), dem-
onstrates extreme instability, and is not always fl exible 
or free from corruption. This image refl ects a situation 
in which the highly qualifi ed part of the youth is not in 
demand in its own country or works in non-production 
areas. 
The attempts of the Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Re-
public to create a reserve of civil servants and recruit 
graduates of international educational programs has 
not produced the expected result. Possibly, the ap-
peal itself is not enough, and more actions should be 
taken, in particular, setting attractive salaries, provid-
ing guarantees against arbitrary rotations during lead-
ership changes, and opportunities for career growth. 
The questions on real reforms in public administration 
and formation of state bureaucracy, which have al-
ready been elaborated by several authors, are relevant 
as never before (К. Bekbolotov. On the way to perfect 
bureaucracy: future of public administration in Kyrgyz-
stan. Source: http://www.ipp.kg).  
Options to solve youth unemployment problems 
The youth employment policy must be matched 
with the strategy of youth development and target 
programs, and also must be coordinated by fi nancial, 
credit, and investment policies of state, as well as by 
sector-specifi c policies (agriculture, education, indus-
try, and others). The starting point must be strategies 
for economic and social development.
Employment programs are usually either directed 
towards decreasing the supply of labor, or stimulat-
ing the demand of 
labor market (an 
increase in work 
places).  
World experi-
ence in programs 
directed towards 
stimulating de-
mand for labor in-
cludes the identifi cation and development of sectors 
which have the potential to grow in accordance with 
the competitive advantages of the country, as well as a 
set of fi scal, investment, and credit programs directed 
to support such sectors. Also included are such pro-
grams as the construction of roads and infrastructure 
to integrate isolated parts of economy, subsidies or 
tax privileges for employers who set quotes for youth 
newly entering labor market or youth with limited 
physical abilities.
There are also programs that assist in the provision 
of headhunting services between potential employers 
and employees via information and consulting ser-
vices, career guidance, and trainings. Usually, such ser-
vices are provided by labor-registry offi  ces or various 
forms of placement services.  
It is necessary to mention that in the youth compo-
nent of the national employment policy of the Kyrgyz 
……it is necessary to 
formulate diff erentiated 
policy and implement various 
programs targeted towards 
various categories.
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Republic the stress is put on creating and strengthen-
ing youth labor-registry offi  ces. Of course, it is an im-
portant aspect of the employment program, which 
needs development and improvement. However, since 
labor-registry offi  ces play the role of middleman in the 
labor market and are aimed to neutralize market fail-
ures, one must not expect that labor-registry offi  ces 
are able to infl uence strongly the general situation 
in the youth labor market under the condition that 
workplaces are not created. It is important to combine 
these methods with other instruments, primarily with 
economic and other preventive actions in terms of 
improving the quality of professional education and 
strengthening its ties with the market.
All employment programs have pluses and minuses, 
and while choosing a strategy, one must make a cost-
benefi t analysis. In my opinion, in order to implement 
a more eff ective youth employment policy, it is neces-
sary to formulate diff erentiated policy and implement 
various programs targeted towards various categories. 
For example, a separate approach must be practiced 
towards the most educated and qualifi ed part of the 
youth by creating the most favorable conditions for 
employment in the public sector or for opening a pri-
vate business. Possibly, youth with limited physical 
abilities needs a more socially-oriented approach and 
state regulation, whereas rural youth require encour-
agement toward self-employment and the develop-
ment of small entrepreneurship via access to credits 
and stimulation of economic activities in the regions. 
Educational policy, which is in fact the most eff ec-
tive in terms of preventive actions on improving em-
ployment opportunities, must be reformed.  Here, it is 
important not to rush from one extreme to another. 
Lately, the issue has been often raised on improving 
professional and technical education, which has been 
destroyed throughout the period of independence. 
However, while planning a development strategy for 
elementary and middle professional education, one 
must take into account the tremendous changes that 
the structure of economy has undergone. Therefore, 
there is a need for a rational approach to the prepara-
tion of certain specializations.  
Conclusion
The situation in the sphere of employment arous-
es great concerns. While making up 60% of the labor 
force, youth (a category that includes those under 34 
years are facing tremendous challenges and additional 
barriers in the labor market, especially those who are 
entering it for the fi rst time. Lingering unemployment 
in the country, a decline in employment level together 
with a simultaneous increase in the able bodied work 
force, and an increase in the inactive part of the popu-
lation (including those among the youth) require radi-
cal actions on improving the employment situation.
At this stage, the government is focusing on export-
ing the labor force as a basic tool to ease the tension 
in the internal job market, though many analysts draw 
attention to the negative consequences of mass emi-
gration. If not accompanied by a set of other eff orts, 
migration will not only fail to solve the problem of 
economic growth, but will lead to a mass of negative 
consequences in the economy and social sector in the 
long term.  
Recommendations
The solution to issues of youth employment starts 
with the macroeconomic situation, which must be 
directed towards creating conditions for the devel-
opment of a national labor market, retaining current 
work places, and creating new ones for the citizens to 
perform economic activities.
It is necessary to put eff orts into coordinating tax 
policy and establishing favorable conditions for inves-
tors and employers to create new work places. There 
is a need for mechanisms in trade and exportation, 
attracting direct investments, developing small and 
medium business, family business, and agriculture. 
The coordination of employment policy and sectoral 
policy is signifi cant.  
Taking into account the low ability of the labor mar-
ket to absorb graduates, reforms in education must 
result in the preparation of competitive a labor force 
in synchrony with demand. There is also a need to en-
courage career development centers in universities 
and youth employment centers. 
Taking into account the limited capacity of the 
budget and tremendous external debt, it is neces-
sary to stimulate the mobility of labor force, introduce 
amendments in the taxation of salaries, and encour-
age self-employment. Integration of the black market, 
or informal economy, into the legitimate economy is 
another big objective. 
In order to be eff ective, youth employment policy 
must be diff erentiated and targeted towards certain 
segments of the youth. Special attention must be giv-
en to the youth who are newly entering labor market. 
It is necessary to direct international organizations 
to implement projects which would expand the op-
portunities for youth employment in the domestic 
job market via credit programs, community develop-
ment programs, and development of opportunities for 
youth entrepreneurship. 
Additionally, the situation in the labor market must 
be seriously researched and monitored. It is necessary 
to inform the public on general practical steps direct-
ed towards the solution of problems in the youth labor 
market and contribution to interrelations between the 
state and civil structures working on youth issues.
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Aleksey Malashenko:
“A Dialogue with Islamists is Inevitable for Central Asian States”
Struggle against terrorism and religious extremism has lately become a topical issue in Kyr-
gyzstan, in light of series of special operations of law enforcement agencies in the south of the 
country. Several alleged militants as well as Imam from the Karasuu Mosque were killed dur-
ing these operations. On this topic the IPP has interviewed Dr. Aleksey Malashenko, Scholar-in-Resi-
dence at the Carnegie Moscow Center, and a well-known specialist on Islam in post-soviet states. 
IPP: Dr. Malashenko, the Kyrgyz Security Forces have re-
cently intensifi ed their struggle against religious extremism 
in southern Kyrgyzstan. In your opinion, how realistic is the 
threat of religious extremism in Central Asia, and particu-
larly in Kyrgyzstan?  
Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: Such a threat is realistic. 
Religious extremism is a reactive form of expressing one-
self against unsuccessful state policies, state corruption 
and the general despair of a nation and its population. 
Islamists have always been popular in these areas, where 
a secular opposition does not exist. In this respect, the 
threat of religious extremism is higher in Uzbekistan 
than in Kyrgyzstan. 
These Islamist forces are not able to cause a kind of 
“Green Revolution” single-handedly. In crises situations 
provoked by other domestic (and international) forces, 
these religious extremists would be fi sh in water, sup-
porting certain groups while at the same time, promot-
ing their own strategies. 
The Islamists’ slogans could be easily used both by ab-
solutely secular people and by manipulators and imams 
intent on leading the masses to Islamic causes. These 
sorts of things have already taken place inside and out-
side Kyrgyzstan.
IPP: According to the former Chairman of the National 
Security Service, Busurmankul Tabaldiev, religious extrem-
ists had declared jihad against Kyrgyz law enforcement 
agencies after its series of special operations. Should we 
expect a long-term escalation of confl ict? 
Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: We will see. A declaration 
of jihad against law enforcement agencies is well known 
among authorities in the Russian Northern Caucasus. 
It has been continuing in the Caucasus for quite a long 
time, with occasional success. 
I do not think that Hizb-ut-Tahir, or any other religious 
groups in Kyrgyzstan, have such authority. God save us 
from them acquiring such power. In my opinion, such 
claims are rather declarations of one’s intentions. Takhir 
Yuldashev has also declared a “war” against all Central 
Asian Presidents. 
Yet, states must not ignore such declarations. Nation-
al authorities must pay great attention to local news and 
be ready for anything. Things may start anywhere, be it 
Uzbekistan or Afghanistan, and easily spill over to neigh-
boring countries. One should keep in mind that not only 
‘anti-terrorists,’ but also terrorists themselves are capable 
of cooperation. 
IPP: How would you assess the current counterterrorism 
and counter-extremism policies of Kyrgyz authorities?
Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: The Kyrgyz authorities use 
banal policies, reminiscent of the policies employed in 
neighboring countries. Since I personally have had an 
opportunity to indirectly participate in one of these anti-
terrorist operations, I can testify that the majority of the 
time, these operations target people who do not have 
any relations to terrorism, but quite on the contrary, are 
fi ghting terrorism themselves. 
On the other hand, recently there have been no ex-
cesses related with religious extremism in Kyrgyzstan. 
This gives law enforcement agencies grounds to claim 
their operations successful. 
IPP: Then how must this policy must be improved to be 
more eff ective at minimizing religious tension while reduc-
ing the infl uence of radical movements in Kyrgyzstan? 
Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: I think the main tactic 
should be a “Carrot and Stick” policy. It is necessary to 
communicate to Islamists willing to talk, even with radi-
cal religious groups. The main thing to do is to not pro-
voke people to ascend the “extremism ladder”. People 
are not born as terrorists. In many respects, terrorism is 
often provoked by the policies of national authorities. 
IPP: To what extent does the social situation in Kyrgyz-
stan predispose a further escalation in confrontation be-
tween the religious minority (or majority) and the national 
authorities of Kyrgyzstan?
Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: The tension may only 
arise if the whole social situation gets much worse. In 
the event of a confl ict, any political party would fi nd its 
proper role. Neither Hizb-ut-Tahir, nor any other groups 
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would be able to do this on their own.  They may be 
able to organize two or three serious meetings, yet 
only at the local level. People are tired of political ten-
sion. But then again, let me reiterate that everything 
depends mainly on the position and policies of the na-
tional authorities. 
IPP: What about any external infl uences on the social 
situation in Kyrgyzstan? 
Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: First of all, one could only 
expect external infl uences to aff ect Kyrgyzstan if the 
society is primed for that. An Arab-style Islamic funda-
mentalism or any other religious fundamentalism will 
only prosper locally if the population is antagonized by 
economic and social failures by the state. In Kyrgyzstan, 
such preconditions do exist. Yet, at the same time, I be-
lieve that the society still hopes to be able to overcome 
these challenges independently. 
There are not many foreign religious fundamental-
ists operating within Kyrgyzstan. Regarding graduates 
from foreign, religious universities who imported other 
variations of Islam to Kyrgyzstan, for the time being, 
their target groups are limited. 
 
IPP: How would you assess the fears of impending 
radical Islamist rule in Uzbekistan, as domestic power 
struggles continue to grow? What would be their impact 
be on Kyrgyzstan? 
Dr. Aleksey Malashenko: They will not be able to 
come to power; however, they could certainly partici-
pate in various political coalitions. Similar instances 
have taken place in many Muslim countries, from Ta-
jikistan to Yemen, Malaysia, and even to Turkey. If one 
were to assume that the Central Asian States are within 
the Islamic sphere of infl uence, which indeed they are, 
then a dialogue with varying degrees of Islamism must 
be recognized as a part of the political process. We must 
not discount the potential of some moderate Islamists 
to become elected members to government. 
FORGING BROKEN LINKS: UZBEKS AND THE STATE IN KYRGYZSTAN
Officially comprising 13% of Kyrgyzstan’s overall population of 5 million people, Uzbeks are the 
country’s largest ethnic minority group. The strategy towards the Uzbeks will be important for ensur-
ing Bishkek’s interests not only in Kyrgyzstan, but also within Central Asia. That is, Bishkek’s response 
to minority problems will set an important precedent and model for how governments can respond 
to the increasing presence of politically mobilized groups and their demands throughout the region. 
Alisher Khamidov, PhD Candidate, Johns Hopkins University, U.S.A.
Introduction
On May 27, 2006, ethnic Uzbeks held a political rally 
in the southern town of Jalalabad. The rally participants 
demanded a more proportionate representation of eth-
nic minorities in various spheres of economy and politi-
cal life. The rally delegates, who came from all over Osh 
and Jalalabad provinces, urged authorities to designate 
Uzbek as an offi  cial countrywide language and expressly 
include more Uzbeks in judiciary, legislative and law-en-
forcement functions. They also demanded state support 
for cultural and educational programs for Uzbeks.
The Jalalabad protest, which drew an estimated 700 
participants, marked a radical turn for Uzbek commu-
nity leaders in their eff orts to be heard in Bishkek. Uzbek 
rights activists had in recent years limited their activities 
largely to the drafting of resolutions and petitions. A con-
gress of Uzbeks held in January, for example, adopted an 
appeal to President Kurmanbek Bakiev to adopt “a clear 
policy stance” on minority rights issues.
The Jalalabad protest was the fi rst time Uzbeks took 
their grievances to the streets since inter-ethnic clashes 
rocked southern Kyrgyzstan in 1990. It also showed that 
Uzbek community leaders are now embracing more 
confrontational tactics, a shift that heightens the risk of 
inter-ethnic discord in southern Kyrgyzstan, where Uz-
beks make up a signifi cant share of the population. 
A timely military parade by border guards in Jalala-
bad’s main square ahead of the Uzbek protest was in 
fact a show of strength designed to prevent escalation 
of ethnic riots. Two days later, security forces dispersed a 
counter-protest staged by 60 Kyrgyz youths. 
That ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan are intensifying ef-
forts to expand their political and cultural rights is clear. 
What is less clear, however, is why Uzbeks have decided 
to act more purposefully now. During the regime of for-
mer President Akaev, Uzbeks proved to be a loyal force 
behind the executive power. Government authorities 
also used Uzbek community infl uence during parlia-
mentary and local elections. 
This paper addresses the question by examining the 
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turbulent relationship between the state and  Uzbeks in 
Kyrgyzstan. The fi rst part looks at the Uzbek community, 
its concerns, its leaders, and political actions. The second 
part explores state responses toward the Uzbeks. Finally, 
it off ers a set of policy recommendations to address cur-
rent challenges and rising ethnic tensions. 
A House of Discord: Uzbek actors and organizations
Offi  cially comprising 13% of Kyrgyzstan’s overall pop-
ulation of 5 million people, Uzbeks are the country’s larg-
est ethnic minority group. According to unoffi  cial Uzbek 
estimates, they comprise 20% of the population. Most 
Uzbeks live in the southern regions of Osh and Jalala-
bad.
Despite their numbers, Uzbeks have yet to voice a de-
fi ning set of policy goals,
or mobilize around a single Uzbek leader. Kyrgyzstan 
is home to several organizations established to promote 
Uzbek interests: the National-Cul-
tural Centre (O’zbek Milliy Madaniyat 
Markazi), the Osh Society of Uzbeks 
(O’zbeklar Jamiyati), Jalal-Abad Soci-
ety of Uzbeks and a number of newly 
formed associations such as “Davr,” 
“Sarbon,” and “Uzbeks of Kyrgyzstan.” 
The National-Cultural Center, head-
ed by Muhamedjan Mamasaidov, a Member of Parlia-
ment (MP), is the Uzbek community’s offi  cial voice in 
Kyrgyzstan. It is also the elder of all the other groups as 
it was established in September 1990 following the June 
clashes in Osh and Uzgen. It is structured along regional 
lines (there are branches in Osh, Jalalabad, Batken, and 
Chui provinces) and the association is coordinated at a 
national level in Bishkek. Along with other ethnic asso-
ciations, it is represented in the Assembly of the People 
of Kyrgyzstan.
The Osh Society of Uzbeks was founded in 1996-97 
by the Osh-based businessman and MP Davron Sabirov 
following his personal discord with the leadership of 
the Uzbek National Center. Two issues precipitated the 
split. Sabirov argued that the Uzbek National Center 
was co-opted by the central authorities in Bishkek. He 
had also supported the shift to the Latin alphabet fol-
lowing Uzbekistan, whereas other Uzbek leaders saw 
this as a pro-Uzbekistani and therefore a destabilizing 
maneuver. Senior leaders of the organization feared 
these moves would threaten government support and 
endanger the policy of inter-ethnic stability.
The Jalalabad Society began as a branch of the 
Uzbek National Center. However, in later years, it be-
came an independent association. Kadyrjan Batyrov, a 
wealthy businessman with vast economic interests, is 
the formal leader of the organization. In recent years, 
the Society has acted as the most vocal representative 
of the broader Uzbek community. For example, the or-
ganization holds annual conferences of ethnic Uzbeks. 
In fact, it was the Society that organized the May 2006 
rally of the Uzbeks. 
Davr (epoch) was formed in September 2006 in the 
southern town of 
Mailuusuu. Davr 
representatives 
describe their 
primary aim as 
promoting gov-
ernment poli-
cies and working 
for greater harmony among ethnic groups. However, 
some observers allege that Davr has been conceived 
by Bishkek as a counterweight to an existing group, the 
Jalalabad Society of Uzbeks, whose views are not to the 
government’s liking.
In addition to these formal groups, 
a number of informal Uzbek youth or-
ganizations have emerged in recent 
years. Among them are the Sarbon 
and the Uzbeks of Kyrgyzstan. Sarbon 
was founded in Spring 2006 by Dav-
ron Sabirov. The Uzbeks of Kyrgyzstan 
was founded in 2004 by a group of 
ethnic Uzbek students. 
Perhaps not surprising given the diverse nature of its 
components, relations within the Uzbek organizations 
have long been chaotic at best and confrontational at 
worst. While vocally agreeing on some basic issues, lead-
ers have been divided in their political demands and 
ways to achieve them.
This can be explained by a set of geographical, ideo-
logical, professional and generational diff erences. While 
an increasing number of young Uzbeks are becoming 
prominent within the Uzbek community, the vast ma-
jority of leaders are representatives of the older genera-
tion, which preserve some of the values and ideals of 
the Soviet past. Another essential factor in fostering dif-
ferences among Uzbeks is the geographic division. The 
Jalalabad-Uzbek leaders are more assertive and confron-
tational in pursuing Uzbek demands, while Osh-based 
leaders, who witnessed the 1990 interethnic riot, tend to 
be more moderate. 
The platforms of Uzbek organizations vary, but they 
all share a desire to have greater infl uence in represent-
ing the Uzbek community. On political issues, there is 
broad agreement that there is a need for more propor-
tionate representation of the Uzbeks and other ethnic 
minorities in various economic and political spheres. 
They all want the Kyrgyz authorities to expressly include 
more Uzbeks in judiciary, legislative and law-enforce-
Despite their numbers, Uz-
beks have yet to voice a defi n-
ing set of policy goals, or mo-
bilize around a single Uzbek 
leader
Perhaps not surprising given 
the diverse nature of its com-
ponents, relations within the 
Uzbek organizations have long 
been chaotic at best and con-
frontational at worst.
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ment functions. They are also demanding state support 
for Uzbek cultural and educational programs. 
Despite agreeing on general political strategy, Uzbek 
organizations have sharp diff erences on tactics concern-
ing key issues, including language rights and Uzbek 
education. Some leaders steadfastly oppose drastic de-
mands such as recognition of Uzbek as an offi  cial lan-
guage, while others, including Jalal-Abad Society and 
Osh Society, feel that obtaining offi  cial status for the lan-
guage and promotion of Uzbek education are essential 
to the Uzbek community. 
Geopolitically, there are likewise both similarities and 
diff erences of opinion. While some segments see Uz-
bekistan as a vital protector of Uzbek interests, others 
consider international community’s role to be indispens-
able. Following Uzbekistan’s harsh border policies and 
the violent crackdown on religious dissent, many Uzbeks 
feel alienated from the Uzbekistani leadership. In recent 
years, Uzbek community leaders have turned more and 
more to international actors including the OSCE’s High 
Commissioner for National Minorities.   
Sources of funding for Uzbek associations vary. Some 
of them rely on grants from international NGOs and pri-
vate donors. But nearly all these associations rely pre-
dominantly on the personal resources of their individual 
leaders and their vast patronage networks. Uzbek orga-
nizations also gain fi nancial support from various fund-
raising events in their constituencies and from infl uen-
tial allies in the business elite. 
Long-standing demands revisited
There are several reasons that explain why there is 
growing Uzbek agitation for civil rights. Some observers 
see a link between Uzbek complaints and a struggle over 
economic assets unleashed by the March 2005 revolu-
tion. In keeping with this view, the Uzbek elite is using 
discrimination rhetoric to protect their property, which 
has been endangered by expanding redistribution of 
property that started after the revolution. In this regard, 
many observers point to Kadyrjan Batyrov. According to 
local observers, Batyrov organized a rally of Jalal-Abad 
Uzbeks on May 27th because some of his economic as-
sets have been under threat. Several of Batyrov’s proper-
ties are occupied by rural dwellers from nearby Kyrgyz 
villages. 
While economic factors do play a role, government’s 
unresponsiveness to Uzbek concerns is a more impor-
tant factor that is fomenting frustration in the Uzbek 
community. In the view of many Uzbek representa-
tives, the March 2005 revolution did not bring positive 
changes for their community. Many evoke President 
Askar Akayev’s period, characterized by his policy called 
“Kyrgyzstan is our Common House.” During the Akaev 
period, the Uzbeks also used the People’s Assembly, a 
formal association of ethnic minorities to represent their 
interests. Now the People’s Assembly has lost much of its 
former infl uence.  For example, prominent Uzbek lead-
ers were denied permission to speak about their prob-
lems at the August 5th meeting of the People’s Assembly 
in Bishkek.  
Growing Uzbek restlessness is also linked with the 
breakdown of informal channels of communication be-
tween Kyrgyz government offi  cials and Uzbek commu-
nity leaders. Several Uzbek leaders such as Muhamedjan 
Mamasaidov, Kadyr Batyrov and a few others maintained 
personal ties with Akaev. Following the March revolu-
tion, however, no Uzbek leader has a strong relationship 
with Bakiev. Among the few Uzbeks who are in Kyrgyz 
government is Sherkozi Mirzakarimov, Deputy Minister 
for Internal Aff airs. Anvar Artykov, an ethnic Uzbek who 
was Bakiev’s ally during the revolution, was dismissed in 
early December as the governor of the Osh region, and 
became an opposition activist. 
Artykov is probably the only Uzbek leader who joined 
the opposition movement. Uzbek elites steer clear of 
the opposition. At present, the Uzbeks are wary of the 
growing infl uence of Kyrgyz nationalists in politics and 
in the opposition movement. Nationalist sentiment is 
arising out of the frustration generated by the country’s 
stagnant economic conditions. Some leading members 
of the Kyrgyz opposition movement have expressed dis-
trust of Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek population. 
Fear of opposition leaders prompted several Uzbek 
community leaders to join the pro-presidential move-
ment “Alga, Kyrgyzstan!” (Forward, Kyrgyzstan!), in 2004. 
Their action was 
meant not only 
to protect the 
status of Uzbeks, 
but, also, to pro-
tect whatever 
economic gains 
made by the Uz-
bek community 
during Akaev’s 
tenure. As many Uzbek community representatives saw 
it, political change could pose a threat to their economic 
livelihood. According to one Uzbek entrepreneur, “If new 
people come to power, they will start extorting money 
from us, and [the cycle of ] corruption will start all over 
again.” These fears turned out to be not unfounded. 
The prospect of joining the broader opposition move-
ment continues to cause heated debates within the Uz-
bek organizations. For example, the Uzbeks of Kyrgyz-
stan, has argued in its offi  cial statements that Uzbeks 
leaders have hurt their cause through their inability to 
forge strong links with an opposition coalition. Mean-
while, other organizations such as the Society of Uzbeks 
While economic factors 
do play a role, government’s 
unresponsiveness to Uzbek 
concerns is a more important 
factor that is fomenting 
frustration in the Uzbek 
community.
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and National Center continue to insist that the Uzbeks 
have to maintain neutrality. 
Part II.  Bakiev Administration and the Uzbeks
During the Akaev period, the Kyrgyz authorities cre-
ated an informal pact allowing various 
ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan to es-
tablish informal spheres of infl uence 
in various economic and civil service 
sectors. For example, the Kyrgyz pre-
dominate in government and law-en-
forcement bodies, while Uzbeks are 
prominent in commerce in southern 
provinces, ethnic Uighurs are active 
in trade with China, and Dungans are 
prominent in agriculture.
Authorities appear reluctant to challenge this infor-
mal distribution of sectors. Top Kyrgyz offi  cials fear that 
granting more rights to Uzbeks would lead to further de-
mands, including  claims for autonomy and secession to 
Uzbekistan. These fears have driven Kyrgyz policy since 
ethnic rioting occurred in 1990. In 1999, a group of Kyr-
gyz legislators advocated for a bill that would forbid the 
recruitment of ethnic Uzbeks into the Kyrgyzstani army. 
Some observers alleged that the government had tried 
to scuttle Uzbek solidarity since the mid-1990s, when 
the Uzbek National Cultural Center split into two sepa-
rate organizations.
Since coming to power in March 2005, the Bakiev ad-
ministration has sought to stake out a neutral position 
on minority rights-related issues. But Bakiev has made a 
number of positive statements recognizing the impor-
tance of the “national question,” and in December 2005 
he agreed to serve as chairman of the Kyrgyzstan Assem-
bly of Peoples, viewed as an astute move. 
These statements notwithstanding, Bakiev has not 
demonstrated a desire to act on the specifi c requests 
being aired by Uzbeks. In July 2006 meeting with Parlia-
ment members, Bakiev sternly criticized Kadyrjan Baty-
rov and some other Uzbek leaders for their activities that 
agitated Uzbek community. 
In response, Batyrov and other Uzbek activists argued 
that offi  cials have engaged in activities designed to snuff  
out Uzbek agitation for expanded civil rights, including 
recognition of Uzbek as a state language. To support this 
view, they pointed to the case against Mamatkadyr Kara-
baev, who led a May 27th rally in Jalalabad calling for Uz-
bek language rights. Shortly after the rally, Karabaev was 
arrested, and on August 2nd, he received a seven-year 
suspended sentence after being found guilty of fraud 
and falsifi cation of offi  cial documents. Karabaev insisted 
in an interview with the Ferghana.ru web site that the 
case against him was “fabricated.”
Several reasons explain Bakiev’s reluctance to tackle 
Uzbek problems. Elements of Bakiev’s political sup-
port base, namely Kyrgyz nationalists, are steadfast op-
ponents of Uzbek demands, in particular the eff ort to 
declare Uzbek as an offi  cial state language. National-
ists believe that recognition of Uzbek 
could end up being the precursor of a 
campaign for Uzbek autonomy. Given 
Bakiev’s current political diffi  culties in 
Bishkek, he is unlikely to do anything 
to risk alienating his core supporters. 
More importantly, the authorities at 
present lack the political will to tackle 
inter-ethnic issues, as politicians’ at-
tention have been fi xed on Bishkek, the scene of an 
emerging power struggle between President Kurman-
bek Bakiev’s Administration and Parliament.
What are the negative impacts of this policy? 
The government’s reluctance to address the inter-
ethnic issue may have a number of negative implica-
tions. In the worst-case scenario, it may lead to destabi-
lization in southern Kyrgyzstan. A fi ght or a localized riot 
can erupt into a full confl ict and the Kyrgyz and Uzbek 
elites may not be able to control unruly masses of rioters. 
Several events in 2006 have revived concerns about the 
potential for inter-ethnic clashes. A January 31st brawl 
between Kyrgyz and Dungan teenagers in the village 
of Iskra, about 45 miles (70 kilometers) from the Kyrgyz 
capital Bishkek, precipitated a broader inter-ethnic clash. 
Another troubling episode occurred January 12th near 
the Uzbek enclave of Sokh, which is surrounded by Kyr-
gyzstan’s Batken Province. Some Tajiks reportedly beat 
up two Kyrgyz citizens. The next day roughly 150 resi-
dents of the Kyrgyz village Sogment gathered, intend-
ing to retaliate. A potentially more serious incident was 
averted largely through the mediation eff orts of some 
local NGOs. 
A less dangerous scenario is that Uzbek groups will 
consolidate their ranks and may join broader opposition 
forces. For example, several Uzbek organizations pledged 
to unite forces at a September 17th meeting in Osh. Fol-
lowing the May 27th rally, a number of Uzbek activists 
called on their leaders to join the broader opposition 
movement. 
Forging the Links: Policy Recommendations
Given the potential for destabilization, the offi  cial Bish-
kek must develop a response to growing demands of the 
Uzbeks. At this time, however, Bishkek does not have a 
coherent policy towards either the Uzbeks or other ethnic 
minority groups. The Bakiev administration must there-
fore develop a plan of action. This policy, though, may 
Elements of Bakiev’s political 
support base, namely Kyrgyz 
nationalists, are steadfast 
opponents of Uzbek demands, 
in particular the eff ort to 
declare Uzbek as an offi  cial 
state language.
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have wider implications.
The strategy towards the Uzbeks will be important for 
ensuring Bishkek’s interests not only in Kyrgyzstan, but 
also within Central Asia. That is, Bishkek’s response to 
minority problems will set an important precedent and 
model for how governments can respond to the increas-
ing presence of politically mobilized groups and their de-
mands throughout the region. 
In order to craft a well-informed and eff ective policy to-
ward Uzbeks, it is important that the authorities put aside 
some misleading assumptions about Uzbeks. In particu-
lar, the Bakiev administration should stop viewing Uzbeks 
with suspicion. Many Uzbeks, especially from a new gen-
eration, are proud that they are citizens of a country that 
allows democratic and economic freedoms. Comparing 
their lot with their co-ethnics in Uzbekistan, the Uzbeks 
feel that they are much better off . The Uzbeks have long 
demonstrated their loyalty to the executive power. More 
importantly, offi  cial suspicion of the Uzbeks did not pre-
vent many Kyrgyz politicians to court the Uzbeks during 
elections. Both Akaev and Bakiev have received enormous 
Uzbek backing during presidential elections. 
Bishkek must accept the fact that Uzbeks have become 
a signifi cant economic and political force.  Constituting 
20% of general population, many Uzbeks are prominent in 
trade and commerce in southern regions. The Bakiev ad-
ministration can tap into the resources and political clout 
of the Uzbek community. There are several other crucial 
ways to improve current policy. 
Explore Options for Involving Uzbeks in the Political 
Process
Recent Uzbek agitation for civil rights is the result of the 
denial of their right to
participate in political discourse. Elsewhere in the 
world, the general lesson appears to be that while exclu-
sion of ethnic minority groups from political process leads 
to violence, inclusion leads them to moderate. Principled 
support of democracy and human rights, in this regard, is 
key to moderating radical voices within Uzbek commu-
nity. The option of political engagement has persuasive 
historical evidence. 
The Bakiev administration must work hard to give the 
Uzbeks and other ethnic minority representatives a strong 
sense of belonging and ownership in the country. There 
have been some positive steps in this regard. For example, 
the inclusion of one hour of Uzbek language broadcasting 
in the Kyrgyz National TV programming delighted many 
Uzbeks, residents of the South. 
Despite its usefulness, the theme “Kyrgyzstan is Our 
Common House” has been disregarded. In addition to var-
ious measures to enhance Uzbek participation in political 
and economic life, a new theme that builds on civic notion 
of nationhood which emphasizes the constitutional provi-
sion  “Kyrgyzstan is for all Kyrgyzstanis” should be consid-
ered by authorities. 
The Kyrgyz authorities should also work to restore infor-
mal mechanisms and lines of communication with formal 
and informal Uzbek leaders. An internal power struggle 
is now building up in Uzbek community. Many of those 
recognized as community leaders during the Akayev ad-
ministration are now facing challenges from new Uzbek 
fi gures who maintain close ties with the Bakiev adminis-
tration. Despite this, current Uzbek leaders continue to 
possess a lot of political infl uence because of their vast 
economic resources. 
Bakiev administration should commit itself to maintain-
ing a neutral position in relations with various Uzbek asso-
ciations. In recent weeks, the allegations that the Bakiev 
administration has been fostering Davr as a counterweight 
to Jalal-Abad society appeared in the local press. Such al-
legations, if credible, can alienate other Uzbek organiza-
tions and undercut support for government initiatives. 
The Bakiev administration should involve ethnic 
Uzbeks more fully in the government, judiciary and 
law-enforcement structures. 
Constituting a large portion of the population, the Uz-
beks are concerned about their status. Currently, there are 
practically no Uzbek judges and prosecutors in South Kyr-
gyzstan, the fact that causes resentment of many Uzbeks.
The fi rst step would be to appoint several ethnic Uzbek 
judges and prosecutors in Osh and Jalalbad. The second 
step is to consider appointing an ethnic Uzbek representa-
tive to full ministerial position.”
Continue state support for cultural and educational 
programs. 
One of Kyrgyzstan’s outstanding accomplishments is 
the existence of cultural centers, a theater, and numer-
ous high schools and a university with Uzbek language 
instruction. The authorities should continue to support 
these entities. Many Uzbek schools experience shortages 
of textbooks in Uzbek. The authorities should cooperate 
with Uzbek associations in setting up a community fund 
to address this problem. This involvement will increase 
public approval of the authorities.
Support Civil Society and Democratic Institutions
The lack of a viable outlet for legitimate civic expres-
sion and for securing practical change through demo-
cratic channels meant that ethnic Uzbeks predominate in 
banned Islamic groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir. According to 
some estimates, more than 90% of HT members are ethnic 
Uzbeks. Interview with the party’s new recruits reveal that 
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they join because they feel they are largely underrepre-
sented in political and economic spheres.
In partnership with local organizations, government 
agencies can help direct the activities of civil society 
groups to address better the needs and interests of mar-
ginalized segments of the community. The contribution of 
international grant-making institutions in
fostering grassroots mobilization of underrepresented 
groups is indispensable.
Conclusion
Historically, Kyrgyz leaders have prevented ethnic vio-
lence largely through policies that promoted free market 
and land ownership in order to diff use the possibility of 
confrontation. They also overtly appealed to ethnic mi-
norities. 
Authorities also moved to make pacts with the regional 
elite including ethnic Uzbek leaders. However, the increas-
ing concentration of economic and political power in Bish-
kek, combined with ongoing clashes between authorities 
and regional camps, weaken these outreach eff orts. Ne-
glecting ethnic problems can have a number of destabiliz-
ing implications not only for Kyrgyzstan but also for the 
entire region.
The Bakiev Administration has an opportunity to forge 
stronger links with the Uzbeks. Such an endeavor requires 
political will and a commitment to give Uzbeks a stake in 
how the government is run. 
Roundtable summary
ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION
On September 14, 2006, the Institute for Public 
Policy hosted a roundtable discussion on the current 
political situation in Kyrgyzstan. The discussion was 
initiated in light of the growing tension between the 
President and the Parliament after an incident with 
former Parliament Speaker Omurbek Tekebaev in 
Warsaw involving narcotics, and the alleged involve-
ment of the younger brother of the President, former 
deputy chief of the National Security Council, Jany-
bek Bakiev.  
For a discussion of the causes, nature and future 
of the autumn political tension, the IPP invited the 
program director of the Development Programs Sup-
port Foundation and former adviser to the President, 
Valentin Bogatyrev, director of the Center for Politi-
cal and Legal Research, Tamerlan Ibraimov, Director 
of the Kyrgyzstan office of the Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting, Kumar Bekbolotov, and others. 
In his introductory speech, President of the In-
stitute for Public Policy Muratbek Imanaliev, who 
chaired the discussion, noted that it was expected 
that Parliament alone would start the new political 
season, since political parties and public organiza-
tions are not able to set the political agenda for the 
new political year. Nevertheless, “затравка” turned 
out to very unusual, which predetermined an unusu-
ally high level of political tension. Many MPs began 
openly demanding the resignation of the tandem of 
Bakiev and Kulov. The question that remains open is 
to what extent the incident will impact the further 
political life in the country. 
Valentin Bogatyrev noted that the events of this 
fall represent a third wave of political tension in Kyr-
gyzstan after March 24, 2005. The first wave took 
place in the autumn-winter of last year, when “Parlia-
ment decided that it will play the major role if the 
President does not know what to say.” This wave end-
ed with the resignation of the Speaker of Parliament, 
Omurbek Tekebaev. The second wave was related 
to the series of protest meetings in spring 2006 and 
the attempt to organize a mass public movement to 
place more effective pressure on the President. Ap-
parently, this wave ended with the dismissal of sev-
eral top-level allies of President Bakiev and the mur-
der of Ryspek Akmatbaev in May 2006. 
The scandal with narcotics has provided opposi-
tion MPs with yet another chance to get the Presi-
dent under control, and moreover, to speed up the 
process of moving towards a Parliamentary repub-
lic if the involvement of the President’s brother is 
proved. However, certain authorities have chosen 
another scenario, and will apparently find sufficient 
arguments to prove their innocence, according to 
analysts. They will likely try to increase the number 
of loyal MPs in the Parliament, and to restore their 
reputation among the population. As roundtable 
participants noted however, in any case the primary 
victims of the scandal have been Bakiev and Teke-
baev, whose reputations suffered much.. 
Such waves – efforts to intensify political passions 
– will continue in the future (manifesting themselves 
in the debates over constitutional reforms, econom-
ic outcomes over the year, etc.) Why do such waves 
continue to happen without bringing any concrete 
results? Participants of the discussion argued that 
the major reason is that neither the authorities nor 
the opposition have ideas for development. Just as 
it was under Akaev, the “oppositionness” of political 
opposition is based not on an alternative vision of 
policies, but on the non-acceptance of the President 
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How to Construct an Independent Judiciary: Various Options
and his team. Property redistribution favoring the 
“new people in power” and hurting the vital interests 
of many opposition politicians and a negative atmo-
sphere in the business environment are also among 
the important causes of regular waves of political 
confrontation. 
An important implication of the scandal with “ma-
treshka,” as well as of all previous political confron-
tations, is the growing dissatisfaction of population 
with politics and politicians. In the long run, this 
dissatisfaction may play quite a positive role, as the 
devaluation of political developments should posi-
tively influence the economic development. This is 
especially important today, as Kyrgyzstan, possess-
ing no oil, gas or other resources for development, 
faces an urgent need to find its proper niche in the 
world market. 
HOW TO CONSTRUCT AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY:
VARIOUS OPTIONS
It is worth noting that the specifi cities of our country predetermine our choice of mech-
anism for appointing judges. In other words, we need a method which would bring 
the needed results, be it African, Asian or Western European. We have neither liber-
al and democratic traditions, nor particular wisdom and integrity among our rulers. The 
only path is to try to create an optimal institutional model based on democratic values.
Tamerlan Ibraimov, Director of the Center for Political and Legal Research 
The absence of a truly independent judicial sys-
tem is fairly considered as one of the major barriers 
towards democratization in Kyrgyzstan.
Why is the judicial system not yet perceived as in-
dependent, despite numerous claims of former presi-
dent Akaev and current president Bakiev that no one 
interferes in the work of judges in the country? 
Unfortunately, despite statements of intent, the 
judicial system has not undergone significant chang-
es. Extensive judicial experience shows that disputes 
which directly or indirectly touch upon the interests 
of high officials are always resolved in favor of these 
officials.
Obviously, it is hard to question a specific court’s 
decision based on one’s personal perception, since 
only the court can resolve issues of legitimacy in 
any decision. However, there are numerous cases in 
which decisions have been taken based not on law, 
but on shrewd political considerations. One example 
is the famous decision of the Constitutional court 
that allowed Askar Akaev’s third tenure as president. 
Another example is the case of Feliks Kulov, who was 
imprisoned under one president and acquitted under 
the second immediately after the regime change.
Still, most of the criticism of the courts has been 
based on plentiful evidence of property redistribu-
tion, in which those incorporated into the adminis-
trative system of the state use court decisions get 
their hand on the best pieces of the property pie. 
Evidence of courts working under administrative 
pressure rather than under the legal framework lies 
in the fact that each new wave of rotation in high 
offices leads to a rotation of ownership in the most 
profitable companies, thus demonstrating the prin-
ciple that prevails in non-liberal democracies: the 
wellbeing of a person mostly depends not on eco-
nomic entrepreneurship or luck, but on his seat in 
the system of state power.
The above-stated examples demonstrate the in-
sufficiency of verbal statements about non-interfer-
ence in court cases. There is a need to secure norms 
on the institutional and legal level that would not al-
low such interference. 
 
Today, the Constitution prescribes that local judg-
es are to be appointed by the President with the ap-
proval of the Jogorku Kenesh, and that judges of the 
Supreme and Constitutional Courts are to be elected 
by the Jogorku Kenesh from a pool of candidates 
suggested by the President. Naturally, Deputies sup-
porting the President would vote for the candidates 
he suggests. Thus, the appointment of judges direct-
ly depends on their loyalty to the head of state.
However, the main factor that forces judges to lis-
ten closely to the opinion of the President and his 
administration is that he can dismiss any of them at 
any time. According to the first clause of article 81 
of the constitution, “judges may be dismissed upon 
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their initiative, due to health conditions, for commit-
ting a crime upon the effect of the conviction of the 
court, and also based on other grounds provided 
in Constitutional Law.”
In the article of constitutional law “On the Status 
of Judges of the Kyrgyz Republic,” it is stated, “…local 
judges may also be dismissed early based on the 
results of the official qualifications test, the condi-
tions and procedures of which are defined by the law 
of the Kyrgyz Republic” (clause 11, article 11). While 
the Law “About the procedures of testing the quali-
fications of judges of the KR” states that “the test-
ing of local judges can be conducted on a regular 
basis, as well as in unplanned (individual) cases” 
(article 6), i.e. prior to completion of the judge’s offi-
cial term. The last thing to add is that members of the 
testing commission are appointed by the President 
(article 2 of the mentioned Law). 
Dismissal procedures are more complicated in the 
case of Supreme and Constitutional Court judges. 
The Judges may be dismissed upon the recommen-
dation of the President and by a vote of at least 2/3 
of Jogorku Kenesh Deputies. Of course, considering 
the general misbalance among all branches of pow-
er, the President can easily enforce his decision with-
out any problems. Besides, there are known cases 
in which the chair of the Supreme Court was forced 
to resign or was moved to a position in a different 
branch of power until the end of his term.
Along with the process of dismissal, the applica-
tion of disciplinary measures on judges is also not 
transparent; it lacks clear and objective criteria for 
penalizing judges. The President reserves the right 
to remove judges from their position based on broad 
and undefined grounds, complementing his author-
ity to appoint/recommend candidates for the next 
term. Even though the head of state does not prac-
tice this right often, it effectively influences judges 
and jeopardizes their independence. Judges do not 
feel secure either while serving their term, or when 
looking into their future careers.
These factors demonstrate the dependence of 
judges on the head of state that is laid out on the 
institutional level. Obviously, it is irrational to hope 
that a good president or his administration will not 
use (or threaten to use) their legal privileges for their 
own benefit. The system has to be changed. It is im-
portant that the appointment of judges, and espe-
cially their dismissal, does not depend on the will 
of one branch of power and is not a subject to free 
discretion.
  
It is worth stating that the manner of recruiting 
and training of candidates for the position of judge 
also plays an important role. Judges in developed 
countries are the best skilled staff; one could call 
them the elite of the state apparatus. If this were not 
the case, incompetent Themis workers would be able 
to discredit the very idea of justice. The high profes-
sionalism of judges should be established prior to 
their appointment to the position so that no one 
would doubt their competence or conduct various 
tests as an excuse to get rid of unpleasing people or 
to collect bribes.  
Throughout the world, different mechanisms exist 
for forming a judicial body. In general, they can be 
divided into three groups:
  
1) Judges are appointed in the process of coopera-
tion between the other two branches of power – leg-
islative and executive. In some countries, they are ap-
pointed by a Monarch (Belgium, Denmark, Sweden) 
or a president (India, Sri-Lanka, Bangladesh). In other 
countries, judges are appointed or approved by the 
legislative body (China, Argentina, Brazil, South Ko-
rea). Theoretically, such a model limits the influence 
of other branches of power on the judicial branch. 
In western countries, this pressure is prevented by 
centuries-old liberal and democratic traditions, de-
veloped civil society, and a highly developed legal 
culture. In countries that have yet to obtain liberal 
traditions, such a model is fraught with distortion in 
the system of checks-and-balances. 
2) According to a second model, judges resolve 
issues of appointment independently, usually work-
ing through their own official associations. Such a 
system exists, for instance, in Ecuador. In Greece and 
Pakistan, before appointing a judge, the President 
must consult the Council of Judges. Although such 
a system decreases the possibility of pressure from 
other branches of power on judges, a new problem 
occurs – the creation of an isolated class of judges, 
who are thus not always capable of effective renewal 
and performance.
3) A third group is presented by the model in which 
candidates for judicial positions are recommended 
or approved by an independent body formed by rep-
resentatives from all three branches of power and 
professional legal organizations. Theoretically, such 
a mechanism significantly decreases the possibility 
of pressure being placed judicial power from any one 
source. This model is relatively new, and is used in a 
number of developing countries (in Africa for exam-
ple) as a means to overcome corruption and pressure 
from the government administration.
There is also the United States experience, in which 
judges are elected in the majority of states. Yet, in 
the same country Federal Judges are appointed by 
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the President upon consultation and agreement by 
the Senate. Still, it must be noted that the elective 
principle of judges, peculiar to the U.S., is based on 
the long-term experience of self-organization and 
self-governance in American society. Experts agree 
that electing judges has an inherent defect: judges 
become dependent on the public opinion in their 
constituencies. American researcher L. Friedman 
writes that the principle of electing judges surprises 
many. “What if doctors, policemen or chemists were 
elected?” In this case, the professionalism and inde-
pendence of judges from public opinion are subject 
to doubt.
It is worth noting that the specificities of our coun-
try predetermine our choice of mechanism for ap-
pointing judges. In other words, we need a method 
which would bring the needed results, be it African, 
Asian or Western European. We have neither liberal 
and democratic traditions, nor particular wisdom 
and integrity among our rulers. The only path is to 
try to create an optimal institutional model based on 
democratic values.
Considering Kyrgyzstan’s short experience of Post-
Soviet development with its high level of corruption, 
along with the tendency of the power to manipulate 
judges and constrain the development of civil soci-
ety, it is better to apply the third model of forming 
a judicial body. This model is the best in minimizing 
the possibility of influencing judges, while also not 
allowing the judicial body to turn into a separate es-
tate within the state. This concern is also important, 
because a closed judicial society would unavoidably 
lead to the appearance of corporate cover-up ele-
ments 
Some of main problems of the modern justice sys-
tem of Kyrgyzstan include the following:
 The independence of court system is not in-
stitutionally secured;
 The level of training and competence of 
judges has room for improvement;
 Under funded courts and judges and unclear 
articulation of their responsibilities form a favorable 
environment for the thrift of corruption;
 Society has acquired a deformed legal cul-
ture, in which the level of legal consciousness is still 
low.
Thus, solutions to identified issues of the court 
system lie within the framework of answers to the 
following questions: 
1) What should be done in the context of re-
forms in order to ensure the establishment of a 
truly independent court system?
It is important to develop mechanisms of recruit-
ing, training, appointing, testing, and dismissing 
judges of various levels. These procedures ought to 
be operated on the principles of independence, pro-
fessionalism, and transparency for the judicial branch 
of the government. At that, the long-term dismissal 
of judges should only occur in emergency cases and 
situations clearly described by Law.
For example, an independent body (commission) 
formed by representatives of the courts, attorneys, 
and legal scholars could deal with the recruitment 
and assessment of candidates for the position of 
judge. The commission should be formed from the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of power 
and professional legal organizations on strict prin-
ciples of parity. Such a commission should work on 
the principles of competency, transparency, and 
continual turnover of its members. The appointment 
of judges from the candidates selected by the com-
mission should be reserved for the decision of the 
President (and/or Prime-Minister) and Parliament, 
who would mutually balance each other. In this case, 
the President and Parliament would not appoint 
judges independently, but only select from those 
candidates that went through the procedure of re-
cruitment, training and testing in the commission.
It is worth noting that administrative pressure on 
and bribing of the commission would be complicat-
ed by the large number of its members (at least 20 
people), the continual turnover of its membership, 
the transparency in their work, and also due to the 
fact that it would include only the most high-profile 
and respected lawyers and NGO representatives in 
the country.
 
Issues of early dismissal of judges from their posi-
tion (only in cases strictly provided by Constitutional 
law – for example, health situations, discrediting a 
judge’s title, crime perpetration) could also be re-
solved by this commission.
Thus, such a system provides for the building of 
a foundation for creating independent courts, as 
well as introducing mechanisms of assessment that 
could eliminate doubt about the professionalism of 
judges.
2) How can the level of funding for judges and 
courts be raised in order to avoid creating a favor-
able environment for corruption?
Perhaps the constitution should provide that a 
minimal level of financial resources (one that cannot 
be decreased) be allocated from the state budget for 
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funding the court system. Such a mandate has been 
successfully practiced in several countries, Costa Rica 
for example, where at least 6% of the state budget 
has been allocated to the judicial branch. There are 
also other mechanisms that can be used, depending 
on the degree to which other branches of power re-
spect the importance of the court system.
3) How to create an appropriate and rational 
system of training lawyers (future judges), as well 
as a system for increasing their qualifications?
The world has gained fairly extensive experience 
in training judges, starting from the university desk 
and continuing through internships in which candi-
dates must be critically analyzed and considered for 
possible application as judges.
Having answered the questions outlined, it is 
now possible to form an integral understanding of 
the changes that need to be made in the constitu-
tion. Constitutional reforms allow for a change in the 
principles of forming a judicial body. The primary law 
on this issue should not be overloaded with extra de-
tails. The main changes in the current constitution 
should touch upon the mechanisms of appointing 
and dismissing judges. The primary law should also 
state the status and principles of the formation and 
work of an independent body (commission) con-
cerned with the training and recruitment of judges. 
All other details could be provided in other laws that 
would be passed based on the new constitution.
 
In conclusion, it is worth stating that it is impossi-
ble to build a legal system that would be recognized 
as effective and fair by the public overnight. Its work 
depends directly on the overall level of social devel-
opment, the system of education, and the political 
and legal culture of people. Such phenomena as 
incompetence, corruption, partisanship, and some-
times bold silliness may take place in any society, 
particularly in a transitioning society such as Kyrgyz-
stan. However, to see the desired results tomorrow, 
reforms should take place today. A long path of co-
ordinating interests and fighting for our rights lies 
ahead, but having understood the significance of 
the judicial system and having created constitution-
al foundation for it, Kyrgyz society would increase 
its chances for victory in this struggle considerably, 
while a lack of such an institutional basis seriously 
complicates, postpones, or even makes impossible 
such advancement.
